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Abstract
Evidential Pluralism maintains that in order to establish a causal
claim one normally needs to establish the existence of an appropriate
conditional correlation and the existence of an appropriate mechanism
complex, so when assessing a causal claim one ought to consider both
association studies and mechanistic studies. Hitherto, Evidential Plu-
ralism has been applied to medicine, leading to the EBM+ programme,
which recommends that evidence-based medicine should systematically
evaluate mechanistic studies alongside clinical studies. This paper argues
that Evidential Pluralism can also be fruitfully applied to the social sci-
ences. In particular, Evidential Pluralism provides (i) a new approach to
evidence-based policy; (ii) a new account of the evidential relationships
in more theoretical research; and (iii) new philosophical motivation for
mixed methods research. The application of Evidential Pluralism to the
social sciences is also defended against two objections.
This paper makes the case that a specific account of the epistemology of
causality, namely Evidential Pluralism, can be fruitfully applied to the social
sciences. §1 provides a brief introduction to Evidential Pluralism and its appli-
cation to medicine. §2 argues that there is scope to apply Evidential Pluralism
to the social sciences, in particular, to evidence-based policy, to theoretical
social science research, and to mixed methods research. We then respond to
two objections to the claim that Evidential Pluralism can be applied within
the social sciences: one due to Julian Reiss (§3) and a second due to Francois
Claveau (§4). In §4 we also see how Evidential Pluralism applies to single-
case causal claims in the social sciences. We conclude in §5 that Evidential
Pluralism sheds new light on the use of evidence in the social sciences.
1 What is Evidential Pluralism?
That correlation does not imply causation was already well understood by the
end of the 19th century. One influential response to this platitude was to
replace talk of causation by talk of correlation. Thus Yule (1895, p. 605) says,
‘We have found that the rate of total pauperism is positively correlated with the
proportion of out-relief given . . . This statement does not say either that the
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low mean proportion of the out-relief is the cause of the lesser pauperism or vice
versa: such terms seem best avoided.’ These days, however, this response is
recognised to be unsatisfactory, because it is usually causation that we are
interested in, not correlation. It was important to determine whether the
proportion of out-relief (aid to the poor outside a workhouse) was a cause
of the total level of pauperism, for only if the relationship were causal would a
change to welfare policy be warranted, and only if the relationship were causal
could the proportion of out-relief explain the level of pauperism.
That correlation does not imply causation is witnessed by correlations such
as those between British bread prices and the sea level in Venice (Sober, 2001)
or between the supply of shrimp in the US and the number of people killed
by sharp glass (Vigen, 2015). As is apparent from Table 1, there are a large
number of possible explanations of an observed correlation between variables
A and B, only one of which is that A is a cause of B. In order to establish
causation, one must rule out these other possible explanations.
Fortunately, there is something distinctive about those correlations that
are genuinely causal. If it is genuinely the case that an observed correlation is
attributable to the fact that A is a cause of B, then there is some combination of
mechanisms which explains instances of B by invoking instances of A and which
can account for the magnitude of the observed correlation. It is the existence of
this mechanism from A to B that distinguishes causation from other potential
explanations of a correlation. Thus Russo and Williamson (2007) put forward
the thesis that, in order to establish a causal claim, one normally needs to
establish both the existence of an appropriate correlation and the existence of
mechanism complex that can account for the correlation. While Russo and
Williamson restricted this thesis to medicine and the health sciences, in their
closing remarks they suggested that their thesis might also be applicable beyond
medicine, to the social sciences (Russo and Williamson, 2007, p. 169). In this
paper we follow through on this suggestion, by extending the thesis to the social
sciences. We will not attempt a general defence of this thesis here, nor of its
application to medicine, as this has been discussed at length elsewhere—see,
e.g., Williamson (2019a) and references therein. Instead we shall explain how
this thesis motivates Evidential Pluralism and, in subsequent sections, how
Evidential Pluralism can be fruitfully applied to the social sciences.
The thesis of Russo and Williamson (2007) concerns what one needs to
establish in order to establish causation: the existence of a correlation and the
existence of a mechanism. One can also distinguish the kinds of study used to
establish correlation and mechanism (Illari, 2011; Williamson, 2021c, §3). The
obvious way to establish a correlation is to perform a statistical study, which
samples a large number of individuals, measuring A and B and assessing the
extent to which they occur together. In medicine and the health sciences, these
studies include clinical and epidemiological studies and they often measure A
and B together with some set C of potential confounders, in order to determine
whether A and B are probabilistically dependent conditional on C.1 We shall
refer to any study that tests for an association between A and B by measuring
A and B together as an association study . This class of studies includes both
1A potential confounder is a variable that, so far as one can tell from the available
evidence, plausibly might account for the correlation between A and B—e.g., a common
cause of A and B.
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Table 1: Possible explanations of an observed correlation between A and B.
From Williamson (2019a).
Causation A is a cause of B.
Reverse causation B is a cause of A.
Confounding (selection bias) There is some confounder C that has not been
adequately controlled for by the study.
Performance bias Those in the A-group are identified and
treated differently to those in the ¬A-group.
Detection bias B is measured differently in the A-group in
comparison to the ¬A-group.
Chance Sheer coincidence, attributable to too small a
sample.
Fishing Measuring so many outcomes that there is
likely to be a chance correlation between A
and some such B.
Temporal trends A and B both increase over time for indepen-
dent reasons. E.g., prevalence of coeliac dis-
ease & spread of HIV.
Semantic relationships Overlapping meaning. E.g., phthiasis, con-
sumption, scrofula (all of which refer to tu-
berculosis).
Constitutive relationships One variable is a part or component of the
other.
Logical relationships Measurable variables A and B are logically
complex and logically overlapping. E.g., A is
C ∧D and B is D ∨ E.
Physical laws E.g., conservation of total energy can induce
a correlation between two energy measure-
ments.
Mathematical relationships E.g., mean and variance variables from the
same distribution will often be correlated.
experimental studies and observational studies.
On the other hand, the obvious way to determine whether there is a suitable
mechanism complex by which instances of A are responsible for instances of B
is to carry out studies that look for key features of the putative mechanisms
linking A and B, including intermediary variables as well as the entities and
activities that constitute the mechanism, and the way these constituents are
organised. We shall refer to such a study as a mechanistic study . While it
is in principle possible to design a study that is both an association study
and a mechanistic study, mechanistic studies typically do not measure A and
B together, but instead seek to shed light on component links or parts of
the mechanism complex. Thus there is a sense in which mechanistic studies
typically offer a fine-grained view of the putative causal relationship, while
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Figure 1: Evidential relationships for establishing a causal claim (Williamson,
2021c).
association studies typically offer a coarse-grained perspective.2
These evidential relationships are captured by Fig. 1. Association studies
can be used to directly test the hypothesis that the putative cause and effect are
correlated conditional on potential confounders (C1). In certain circumstances,
they can also indirectly confirm the claim that there is a mechanism responsible
for this correlation (C2): for example, if all the association studies find a large
correlation and all potential confounders have been adequately controlled for,
and other explanations of this correlation (see Table 1) can be ruled out, then
one might infer that there must be some mechanism of action that gives rise to
the correlation. Alternatively, one can confirm the existence of an appropriate
mechanism complex by means of specific mechanism hypotheses which posit
features of the various mechanisms linking A and B (M2). The presence of
these features can then be tested by mechanistic studies (M1). In certain cir-
cumstances, specific mechanism hypotheses can also support the claim that the
variables of interest are genuinely correlated (M3): for example, the features of
a parachute mechanism confirm the claim that, when falling from high altitude,
parachute use is negatively correlated with serious injury, obviating the need
for randomised trials as evidence of causation (Williamson, 2019a, §2.2).
Fig. 1 encapsulates the content of Evidential Pluralism:
2It should be emphasised that a mechanism complex linking A and B may be composed of
multiple mechanisms, some of which may counteract others. For example, there are multiple
mechanisms linking the legalisation of abortion to the crime rate, as we shall see in §2.2.
Note too, that the distinction between an association study and a mechanistic study is
defined relative to the variables of interest A and B. A study that finds some association
between A and D, where D is a purported intermediary variable on a mechanism from A to
B would count as a mechanistic study relative to A and B but an association study relative
to A and D.
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Evidential Pluralism. In order to establish a causal claim one normally
needs to establish the existence of an appropriate conditional correla-
tion and the existence of an appropriate mechanism complex, so when
assessing a causal claim one ought to consider relevant association studies
and mechanistic studies, where available.
Some points of clarification. Firstly, Evidential Pluralism is more specific
than the claim that one should consider all relevant evidence when assessing
the truth of a proposition (aka the Principle of Total Evidence). This is because
Evidential Pluralism specifies what kinds of study are relevant and why they
are relevant. Similarly, Evidential Pluralism is more specific than the claim
that it is desirable to use diverse methods, theories or perspectives in research
(aka ‘triangulation’): Evidential Pluralism holds that a very particular kind of
triangulation is required for causal inference.
Second, Evidential Pluralism is a purely epistemological thesis: it is a the-
sis about establishing and assessing causality, not an analysis of the concept of
cause nor a claim about the metaphysical nature of causality.3 Similarly, Ev-
idential Pluralism makes no direct claims about the nature of mechanisms,
although it does appeal to the concept of mechanism. From the point of
view of the epistemology of causality, it is important to distinguish evidence
of mechanisms from evidence of correlation regardless of whether mechanisms
themselves are ultimately reducible to correlations, laws, dispositions, low-level
causal relations, or none of these. Marchionni and Reijula (2019), for example,
suggest that mechanisms are reducible to chains of difference making involving
intermediary variables, while Ioannidis and Psillos (2017) analyse mechanisms
as causal pathways—a view that they argue requires minimal metaphysical
commitments.4 Such accounts are fully compatible with the two distinctions
to which Evidential Pluralism appeals: the distinction between a correlation
between A and B and a mechanism complex linking A and B, and the distinc-
tion between an association study and a mechanistic study. Only by drawing
these distinctions can one properly understand the evidential relationships in-
volved in the assessment of causality.
Third, Evidential Pluralism is primarily a normative thesis, about how
one ought to assess a causal claim. As to whether causal claims are actually
assessed on this basis varies. The methods of the International Agency for
Research on Cancer, which is charged with assessing carcinogenicity claims,
are arguably compatible with Evidential Pluralism (Williamson, 2019b), while
certain implementations of present-day evidence-based medicine (EBM) are
3To say that Evidential Pluralism is a purely epistemological thesis does not imply that it
is entirely devoid of metaphysical consequences. As Russo and Williamson (2007) and Weber
(2009) observe, some metaphysical theories of causality may better accommodate Evidential
Pluralism than others, in which case Evidential Pluralism favours the former theories over
the latter.
4Hedström and Ylikoski (2010, p. 51) criticise the view that mechanisms in the social
sciences can be understood solely in terms of intermediary variables. While we make no
attempt to settle the question of how best to analyse mechanisms here, we should note that
the literature on Evidential Pluralism often takes a mechanism complex to be composed of
complex systems mechanisms and/or mechanistic processes. A complex-systems mechanism
consists of entities and activities organised in such a way that they are responsible for some
phenomenon (Machamer et al., 2000; Illari and Williamson, 2012). A mechanistic process is
a spatiotemporally contiguous process along which a signal can be propagated (Reichenbach,
1956; Salmon, 1998).
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not (Williamson, 2019a). Present-day EBM presupposes a kind of eviden-
tial monism: it focusses almost exclusively on association studies—especially
randomised controlled clinical studies—and tends to either ignore mechanistic
studies or to view mechanistic studies as inherently low-quality evidence, to
be trumped by association studies. Parkkinen et al. (2018) argue against the
monistic approach of present-day EBM. They develop the EBM+ programme,
which appeals to Evidential Pluralism as grounds for systematically assessing
mechanistic studies alongside association studies, thereby extending the evi-
dence base that is scrutinised by EBM. Indeed, the main novelty of Evidential
Pluralism is its dual focus on association studies and mechanistic studies: many
other approaches to causal evaluation presuppose the primacy of one or other
kind of evidence, or are more radically pluralist.
Fourth, in the above formulation of Evidential Pluralism, the qualification
‘normally’ is used because in the philosophical literature there are well-known
examples of causation without correlation and of causation without mechanism
(see Williamson, 2019a, §1.1.5). A detailed consideration of these pathological
cases would take us too far from the main argument of this paper, so we simply
set them aside here.
Fifth, when we say that one ought to ‘consider’ a study we mean explic-
itly and systematically assess the study, unless the study only bears only on
propositions that have already been established, in which case one only need to
take those propositions into account, not the studies that helped to establish
those propositions. Thus one usually only needs to scrutinise studies that have
a bearing on what is not already established. There is, however, an exception
to this rule: if the new studies overturn previously established claims, then the
evidence for those claims may need to be revisited.
Finally, it is important to be clear what it is to establish the existence
of a mechanism. Establishing a proposition enables it to be used as evi-
dence for other propositions, and thus requires a substantial body of evidence
(Williamson, 2021a). To establish the existence of a mechanism it is not enough
merely to have a story about what the mechanism might be. As mentioned
above, one way to establish the existence of a mechanism is by confirming the
key features of the hypothesised mechanism (channels M1 and M2 in Fig. 1),
while another proceeds indirectly, by ruling out alternative explanations of an
observed correlation (channel C2). If the former route is taken, it is not enough
to establish the existence of some pathway of action: it is also essential to estab-
lish that the influence of this pathway is not negated by that of counteracting
pathways. Thus one needs to consider the mechanism complex as a whole that
links A and B. Moreover, it is not enough to show the purported mechanism
merely exists in some individuals—it needs to be present in enough individuals
to be able to account for the extent of the observed correlation.
2 Applying Evidential Pluralism to the social sciences
In this section we argue that there several ways in which Evidential Pluralism
can be fruitfully applied to the social sciences. Most obviously, the move from
EBM to EBM+ warrants an analogous move from present-day evidence-based
policy (EBP) to EBP+, a new approach to policy appraisal which takes ev-
idence of mechanisms more seriously (§2.1). Of course, causal claims in the
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social sciences are not limited to claims about the effectiveness of proposed
policy interventions—they also include claims about the causes and effects of
societal, economic, legal, geographical, linguistic and psychological variables,
for example. These claims are at the heart of what might be called ‘basic
social science research’. We argue that Evidential Pluralism can be usefully
applied to basic social science research, in addition to policy appraisal, be-
cause it sheds new light on the evidential relationships involved in establishing
causation (§2.2). The question then arises as to how Evidential Pluralism
relates to mixed methods research in the social sciences. We argue in §2.3
that there are important differences between the conceptual distinctions un-
derlying Evidential Pluralism and those prevalent in mixed methods research,
but that Evidential Pluralism can nevertheless be thought of as providing new,
metaphysics-free, philosophical foundations for certain kinds of mixed methods
research.
2.1 From evidence-based medicine to evidence-based policy
In the 1990s, the methods of EBM quickly spread to the evaluation of social
interventions, leading to what is now known as evidence-based policy (EBP).
The Cochrane Collaboration, which promotes EBM, was set up in 1993, while
the Campbell Collaboration, which promotes EBP along similar lines, was
created in 1999.
In the UK, for example, the primary organ of EBP is the government-led
‘What Works Network’, which includes the National Institute of Health and
Care Excellence (NICE) as well as eight other centres tasked with evaluating
social interventions. The What Works Network is built around the use of asso-
ciation studies (in particular, RCTs) as the evidence on which to base an eval-
uation (What Works, 2018a, p. 4) and membership of the network is restricted
to centres which share the ranking of evidence promulgated by present-day
EBM/EBP (Cabinet Office, 2018, p. 3). Allied to the What Works Network
is the UK Government Trials Advice Panel, which was set up in 2015 to pro-
mote the use of RCTs in public policy decision making (What Works, 2018b).
These structures ensure that the monistic methods of present-day EBM/EBP
are entrenched at the heart of policy making in the UK.
The situation in the UK is just one instance of a global phenomenon. In
the US, the dominant approach to EBP is also modelled on EBM, with a focus
on RCTs (Baron, 2018). In addition, the United Nations actively promotes a
global vision of EBP based on statistical association studies—see, e.g., United
Nations (2013). EBP and EBM continue to develop hand-in-hand: e.g., the
Cochrane and Campbell Collaborations share methods at events such as the
‘Global Evidence Summit’, held in 2017 in Cape Town and 2023 in Prague.
Thus, EBP is modelled on EBM, which, as we noted in §1, underestimates
the importance of mechanistic studies. Given this, there is arguably a need
for what we will call ‘EBP+’, i.e., an analogue of EBM+, but applied to pol-
icy evaluation. As with EBM+, the aim of EBP+ is to provide methods for
systematically assessing mechanistic studies and integrating these assessments
with those of association studies in order to determine the status of a causal
claim. The need for EBP+ arises because Evidential Pluralism applies equally
to medicine and policy making. If Fig. 1 captures the key evidential relation-
ships when evaluating a causal claim in medicine, then it does so too in the
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social sciences, in particular when evaluating a social intervention. Moreover,
EBP+ is also required for successful extrapolation: in both medicine and the
social sciences, it is only by considering mechanisms of action that one can
decide whether a causal relationship discovered in a study context can be ex-
trapolated to a target context of application (see, e.g., Steel, 2008; Wilde and
Parkkinen, 2019).5 Thus EBP+ would proceed very much along the same lines
as EBM+. The evaluation methods common to both are set out in detail by
Parkkinen et al. (2018).
One might wonder whether there is some systematic difference between the
social sciences and the biomedical sciences that undermines the applicability of
Evidential Pluralism to the social sciences. However, one cannot draw a sharp
distinction between the evaluation of causal claims in medicine and those in
the social sciences. Indeed, such claims often overlap: health policy interven-
tions are interventions in both medicine and social policy; hence the inclusion
of NICE in the What Works Network. Insofar as one can generalise, the main
methodological difference between the biomedical sciences and the social sci-
ences is that in the social sciences it can be harder to isolate an experiment
from contextual factors that might influence its results and that can thwart
replication. In many cases it can also be harder to properly randomise individ-
uals to social policy interventions, to construct a placebo intervention for the
control group, and to ensure adherence to the social policy interventions being
tested. In addition, it can be harder to successfully extrapolate claim about
the effectiveness of a social intervention from one setting to another than to
extrapolate a claim about the effectiveness of a medical intervention. This is
because social settings can vary much more widely in their social mechanisms
than do human bodies in their pathophysiological mechanisms. All these con-
siderations favour a shift towards Evidential Pluralism over the current reliance
on RCTs.
Some EBP practitioners have indeed begun to question the current focus
on RCTs. For example, Yamey and Feachem (2011) observe that,
while the RCT is rightly hailed as the ‘pinnacle’ of evidence-based
medicine, in the global public health community, there is growing
recognition that new research designs are desperately needed to help
evaluate ‘real world’ programmes. Such designs would, we believe,
also help to illuminate the implementation ‘black box’. (Yamey and
Feachem, 2011, p. 98.)
In particular, one of the What Works centres has begun to recognise the im-
portance of mechanisms. The What Works Centre for Crime Reduction has
developed the ‘EMMIE’ framework for systematic reviews of evidence: Effect
size, Mechanism, Moderator, Implementation and Economics are all compo-
nents of an evaluation (Johnson et al., 2015; Tilley, 2016; Thornton et al.,
2019). From the point of view of Evidential Pluralism, considering mecha-
nisms is an important step in the right direction. However, EMMIE is based
5Cartwright and Hardie (2012, §1.A.1.1) provide an nice example of the importance of
extrapolation to public health policy. They also criticise the way in which EBP focusses
almost exclusively on association studies—in particular on RCTs. Evidential Pluralism can
be thought of as a principled way of addressing some of these concerns with extrapolation
and RCTs. Parkkinen et al. (2018) provide a detailed account of the logic of extrapolation
that is motivated by Evidential Pluralism.
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not on Evidential Pluralism but on the realist evaluation approach of Pawson
and Tilley (1997), and it will be instructive to consider how their approach
differs from one based on Evidential Pluralism.
While mechanisms are important to both realist evaluation and Eviden-
tial Pluralism, there are three key philosophical differences between these two
approaches.
First, the realist evaluation approach of Pawson and Tilley (1997) makes
a firm commitment to scientific realism: specifically, a causal powers meta-
physics of causation (Pawson and Tilley, 1997, pp. 33, 56). This realism is
accompanied by a rejection of Humean and Kantian metaphysics, which hold
that causal relationships are a device we employ to structure the world, and
which do not posit causal powers or causal necessitation ‘out there’ in the
world. Evidential Pluralism, in contrast, is a purely epistemological thesis that
makes no specific metaphysical claims. It is compatible with an anti-realist
account of causation which analyses causal claims in terms of rational beliefs,
for example (Williamson, 2021b, Appendix).
The second philosophical difference between the realist evaluation of Paw-
son and Tilley (1997) and Evidential Pluralism is that, on account of its meta-
physical commitment, their approach involves a rejection of the experimental
methodology that underpins RCTs and certain other kinds of association study.
Evidential Pluralism, in contrast, takes experimental methods to have the po-
tential to provide good evidence, relevant to the assessment of a causal claim. If
Evidential Pluralism is right, one shouldn’t reject these methods—rather, one
should augment them, by considering mechanistic studies alongside association
studies. The aim of EBP+ would be to improve, rather than overturn, present-
day EBP. Third, realist evaluation proceeds from the premise that there is no
logic of evaluation (Pawson and Tilley, 1997, xiii) while Evidential Pluralism
takes there to be a logic of evaluation, portrayed by Fig. 1. According to
this logic of evaluation, causation is established by establishing correlation and
mechanism, which in turn requires assessment of the confirmation channels
C1, C2,M1,M2,M3, i.e., the assessment of any relevant association studies and
mechanistic studies. Parkkinen et al. (2018) show in the context of medicine
that this logic of evaluation can be broken down into a series of practical steps.
We should note that realist evaluation has been developed in a number of
different directions since 1997—see Jagosh et al. (2016), for example, for some
pointers. In particular, not all proponents of realist evaluation now reject
the experimental methodology and RCTs. For example, Bonell et al. (2012)
argue for the use of RCTs in a way that is sensitive to the concerns of realist
evaluation. Moreover, the development of EMMIE can be considered to be a
move towards a logic of evaluation.
Thornton et al. (2019), although proponents of EMMIE, identify some lim-
itations of realist evaluation as implemented in the EMMIE approach. In prac-
tice, EMMIE exclusively scrutinises systematic reviews, which almost always
consider association studies rather than mechanistic studies, so mechanistic
evidence tends to appear rather scant and hence to be rated as weak in EM-
MIE evaluations. From the point of view of Evidential Pluralism, it is not
enough to consider systematic reviews of association studies—it is essential to
articulate specific mechanism hypotheses and to search the literature for evi-
dence relevant to those hypotheses. The International Agency for Research on
Cancer provides an example of good practice here (Williamson, 2021d): each
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carcinogenicity evaluation has a dedicated subgroup responsible for systemat-
ically assessing mechanistic studies.
Furthermore, since an EMMIE evaluation has five components, it is not ob-
vious how these five aspects should combine to give an overall assessment. This
opens the door to subjective judgements of relative importance to influence the
overall assessment. Thus, Thornton et al. (2019) worry that realist reviews may
not be replicable. This is less of a concern for Evidential Pluralism, which only
has two strands to integrate, namely evidence of correlation and evidence of
mechanisms (Williamson, 2021d). Parkkinen et al. (2018, Chapter 7) offer a
systematic way of integrating these two strands in order to come to an overall
assessment.
One final point which is worth noting with respect to EMMIE is that ‘Mech-
anism’ is graded on a scale from 0 to 4 but only grade 4 requires concrete
evidence of mechanism: grades 1 to 3 merely require some story or theory
about what the mechanism might be (Thornton et al., 2019, Figure 2). This
may stem from the important role of theory in realist evaluation (Pawson and
Tilley, 1997, p. 59). In contrast, Evidential Pluralism is concerned with evi-
dence, not theory. In the social sciences, it is often very easy to conjecture a
mechanism hypothesis, and a story of a mechanism that is not backed up by
evidence has no confirmatory value, for the Evidential Pluralist.
Although Evidential Pluralism differs from realist evaluation in important
ways, the two approaches do share some key claims: most notably, that EBP
needs to move beyond EBM’s monistic focus on association studies, and that
mechanisms should play a prominent role. Evidential Pluralism can be thought
of providing some motivation for these claims that is not tied to realism.
There are other methodologies that fit naturally with Evidential Pluralism.
For example, process tracing (Mahoney, 2012a), contribution analysis (Mayne,
2001), and sociomarkers (Ghiara and Russo, 2019) have all been put forward as
ways of developing and evaluating specific mechanism hypotheses and might
thus be invoked to help assess channel M1 in Fig. 1. Moreover, as we shall
see shortly, Evidential Pluralism coheres well with a form of mixed methods
research. First, though, we turn to the use of Evidential Pluralism in areas of
the social sciences other than policy evaluation.
2.2 Evidential Pluralism in basic social science research
In medicine, claims about the effects of interventions are not the only causal
claims of interest. Claims about the effects of pathogens, chemical exposures
and lifestyle factors, for instance, are also central to medicine. More gener-
ally, basic medical research is concerned largely with claims about the causal
components of mechanisms for health or disease. Likewise, the interests of
the social sciences extend well beyond claims about the effects of interven-
tions. The causal components of the mechanisms relevant to the various social
sciences are the bread and butter of basic social science research. Fig. 1 and
Evidential Pluralism apply equally to these causal claims as to claims about in-
terventions. While we do not suggest that social scientists conceptualise their
research methodology in terms of Evidential Pluralism, good social science
research tends to take both association studies and mechanistic studies into
account, where available. (For some examples of mechanistic studies in basic
social science research, of varying study designs, see Table 2.) Framing basic
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Table 2: Examples of mechanistic studies in the social sciences.
Specific mechanism hypothesis Study (and study design)
More stringent search requirements (as an
intermediary variable between strictness
of unemployment benefits and unemploy-
ment rates) lower the chance of being re-
employed by the same employer.
The ‘work search’ experiment
in the research of Johnson and
Klepinger (1994) on the effects of
monitoring and sanctions on un-
employment. (RCT)
Legalised abortion has a disproportionate
effect on the birth of those who are most
at risk of engaging in criminal behaviour,
which in turn decreases crime rates.
The longitudinal analysis in the
research of Donohue and Levitt
(2001) on legalised abortion and
crime rates. See below for more
detail. (Longitudinal study)
The initial endowments to which rebel
leaders have access constrain their tactics
of recruitment, which shape the member-
ship profile of a rebel group. The mem-
bership profile affects its internal organi-
sation and eventually the strategies of vi-
olence in war.
The ethnographic interviews in
the research of Weinstein (2007)
on causes of the patterns of vi-
olence in rebels. See below for
more detail. (Interview)
Family socioeconomic status and men-
tal abilities affect significant others’ in-
fluences (e.g., parental influence, teach-
ers’ influence, and friends’ influence) on
a youth and her own observations of her
ability, which in turn affect her levels
of educational and occupational aspira-
tion, which ultimately influence subse-
quent levels of educational attainment.
The cross-sectional study in the
research of Sewell et al. (1969)




states influences the expectation that
a state has of future trade with other
states, which eventually influences the
chances of military conflict.
The large-N qualitative study
in the research of Copeland
(2015) on economic interdepen-
dence and military conflict be-
tween states. (Large-N qualita-
tive analysis)
social science research in terms of Evidential Pluralism can help researchers to
understand the core confirmatory relationships between items of evidence and
to reach an overall assessment of the credibility of the causal claim of interest.6
6Additionally, Moneta and Russo (2014) argue that in the context of econometrics, Evi-
dential Pluralism can help to elucidate the difference between statistical models, which merely
describe associations, and causal models.
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Of course, Evidential Pluralism is not the only approach to emphasise the
importance of mechanisms to the social sciences. We have already seen that
mechanisms are central to realist evaluation, and a mechanism-based approach
has also been developed and defended as a central part of analytic sociology
(Hedström and Swedberg, 1998; Demeulenaere, 2011). However, Evidential
Pluralism differs from this latter mechanism-based approach, just as it differs
from realist evaluation. Firstly, the two approaches address different questions:
the mechanism-based approach emphasises the role of mechanism-based expla-
nations in the social sciences, whereas Evidential Pluralism concerns the types
of evidence needed to establish a causal claim. For this reason, the mechanism-
based approach focusses primarily on mechanisms, while Evidential Pluralism is
a dualist approach, treating evidence of correlation and evidence of mechanisms
on a par. Second, as in the case of realist evaluation, the mechanism-based
approach makes metaphysical commitments that are not made by Evidential
Pluralism. The mechanism-based approach typically assumes that causal re-
lationships can be analysed or characterised in terms of mechanisms, while
according to Evidential Pluralism, mechanisms are merely an important indi-
cator of causality. Moreover, as Hedström and Ylikoski (2010, p. 64) argue,
‘underlying the mechanism-based approach is a commitment to realism and
an opposition to any form of instrumentalism.’ Evidential Pluralism makes no
explicit metaphysical claims.
As an example of the compatibility of basic social science research with
Evidential Pluralism, consider Donohue and Levitt’s study on legalised abor-
tion and crime rates. Donohue and Levitt (2001) argued that the legalisation
of abortion in the 1970s was a cause of the decline in the crime rates in the
1990s in the United States. In order to establish this causal claim, they pro-
vided evidence of mechanisms as well as evidence of correlation. They found
two mechanisms of action. The first is that legalising abortion reduces crime
through smaller cohort sizes. The smaller cohort that results from legalised
abortion means that when that cohort reaches the late teens or early twenties,
there are fewer young males in their highest-crime years, and thus less crime.7
The second mechanism stems from the fact that abortion has a disproportion-
ate effect on the birth of those who are most at risk of engaging in criminal
behaviour. Teenagers, unmarried women, and the economically disadvantaged
are all substantially more likely to seek abortions (Levine et al., 1999). Re-
cent studies have found children born to these mothers to be at higher risk of
committing crime in adolescence (Comanor and Philipps, 2002). Thus, the two
mechanisms form a mechanism complex linking the legalisation of abortion in
the early 1970s to the drops in crime in the early 1990s.
Donohue and Levitt look for evidence of correlation by focusing on the
variations of national time series of crime and abortion, of differential crime
patterns between states which legalised abortion early and other states, and of
state abortion rates and the state crime rates. They show that the legalisation
7It is shown that the legalisation of abortion leads to a drop in birth rates and that the
crime rate would be expected to fall accordingly (Levine et al., 1999). For example, consider
a town with the population of 10,000. Suppose that the birth rate before the legalisation of
abortion is constant at 2%, while that after the legalisation of abortion is 1%. Also assume
that the overall crime rate is 5%, and those who are aged 18–24 commit the half of crimes. All
other things being equal, one can infer that the overall crime rate will drop by approximately
1% 24 years after the legalisation of abortion.
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of abortion was associated with a subsequent drop in crime. All of violent
crime, property crime, and murder have fallen steadily since 1991, roughly the
time the first cohort born would hit its criminal prime. Additionally, the five
states that legalised abortion in 1970 saw drops in crime before the other 45
states and Washington DC, which legalised abortion in 1973. Also, higher
rates of abortion in a state in the 1970s and early 1980s are strongly linked
to lower crime over the period from 1985 to 1997. Moreover, the observed
correlation also holds conditional on various potential confounders, such as
such as the level of incarceration, the number of police, and measures of the
state’s economic well-being (the unemployment rate, income per capita, and
poverty rate). It is shown that there is no relationship between abortion rates
in the mid-1970s and crime changes between 1972 and 1985, when the cohort
directly affected by abortion legislation would have been very young. Almost
all of the abortion-related crime decrease can be attributed to reductions in
crime among cohorts born after abortion legalisation. In contrast, there is
little change in crime among older cohorts, who were not affected by abortion
legalisation. The correlation is further supported by the more recent study of
Donohue and Levitt (2019).
It is clear that Donohue and Levitt’s justification of the causal claim about
legalised abortion and crime rates accords well with Evidential Pluralism. Not
only do they look for a conditional correlation, but they also seek relevant
mechanisms and they show that these mechanisms can account for the extent
of the observed correlation. What is more, Donohue and Levitt’s criticisms of
the alternative causal explanations are also compatible with the epistemolog-
ical picture provided by Evidential Pluralism. For example, the reason that
Donohue and Levitt dismiss factors such as the increasing use of incarceration
and the rise in police numbers as the causes of the drop in crime rates is that
these trends fail to exhibit an appropriate conditional correlation.
Donohue and Levitt’s study has sparked debate and controversy in the
literature. Both their evidence of correlation and their evidence of mechanisms
have been disputed (Joyce, 2004; Lott and Whitley, 2007; Chamlin et al., 2008;
Foote and Goetz, 2008; Dills et al., 2010). Chamlin et al. (2008), for example,
argue that there is no evidence that the legalisation of abortion led to a decline
in the birth rate for teenage or unmarried women: i.e., they are sceptical of the
evidence of mechanisms. Moreover, Lott and Whitley (2007) question whether
Donohue and Levitt provide the complete mechanism complex from abortion
to crime. As they point out, ‘abortion can eliminate unwanted children and
can benefit many women, but it can also make other women who are unable
to bring themselves to have an abortion worse-off and more likely to have out-
of-wedlock births’ (Lott and Whitley, 2007, p. 324). Joyce (2004) challenges
both correlation and mechanism. In response, Donohue and Levitt (2019)
defend their causal claim with updated evidence, which is relevant to both
correlation and mechanism. That both sides of this debate focus on evidence
of correlation and evidence of mechanism provides some support for the view
that Evidential Pluralism captures the structure of causal inference in the social
sciences. Whether or not Donohue and Levitt are correct, the debate indicates
that good social science research needs to consider both association studies and
mechanistic studies when assessing causal claims.
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2.3 New foundations for mixed methods research
Mixed methods research is now widespread in the social sciences and such re-
search also considers a variety of evidence when assessing causal claims. It is
important not to conflate Evidential Pluralism with mixed methods research:
there are substantial differences between the two, as we shall explain. Neverthe-
less, we shall suggest that Evidential Pluralism can provide new foundations for
those variants of mixed methods research that seek to establish causal claims.
Mixed methods research is usually defined as a methodology or a method-
ological orientation employing both qualitative and quantitative data, methods,
or designs:
With mixed methods research, researchers combine elements of
qualitative and quantitative research approaches (e.g., use of qual-
itative and quantitative viewpoints, data collection, analysis, in-
ference techniques) for the purposes of breadth and depth of un-
derstanding, and for mutual corroboration (Johnson et al., 2007,
p. 123).
[W]e defined mixed-method designs as those that include at least
one quantitative method (designed to collect numbers) and one
qualitative method (designed to collect words), where neither type
of method is inherently linked to any particular inquiry paradigm
(Greene et al., 1989, p. 256).
In mixed methods, the researcher (i) collects and analyses both
qualitative and quantitative data rigorously in response to research
questions and hypotheses; (ii) integrates (or mixes or combines) the
two forms of data and their results; (iii) organises these procedures
into specific research designs that provide the logic and procedures
for conducting the study; and (iv) frames these procedures within
theory and philosophy (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2018, p. 5).
Evidential Pluralism, on the other hand, does not appeal to the qualitative
/ quantitative distinction. Instead it features two other distinctions: (i) the
distinction between evidence of the existence of a conditional correlation and
evidence of the existence of an appropriate mechanism complex, and (ii) the
distinction between association studies and mechanistic studies. It is true that
association studies usually use quantitative methods or designs, while mecha-
nistic studies often employ qualitative methods or designs. But this is not al-
ways the case. Mechanistic studies can have quantitative elements: e.g., when
investigating mechanisms linking legalised abortion and crime rates, Donohue
and Levitt (2001) appeal to various quantitative data and methods. Moreover,
association studies can include qualitative elements: e.g., when examining the
association between economic inequality and democratic transitions, Haggard
and Kaufman (2016, pp. 102–141) employ qualitative methods such as process
tracing.
It is also important to note that Evidential Pluralism is purely an account of
the epistemology of causation, while mixed methods research is a methodology
that sometimes invokes metaphysical presuppositions. In the social sciences, a
variety of metaphysical stances are invoked to motivate the use of certain types
14
of qualitative or quantitative study: for example, positivism, postpositivism,
constructivism, interpretivism, and, as we have seen, critical realism. These
metaphysical stances tend to be mutually incompatible, which creates a tension
in mixed methods research. Accordingly, the options for the mixed methods
researcher are to live with this tension, or to reject any appeal to ‘inquiry
paradigms’—see the above quote of Greene et al. (1989, p. 256). Either way,
mixed methods research apparently lacks coherent philosophical foundations.
A typical response to this dilemma is to appeal to pragmatism. This re-
sponse is rooted in American pragmatism, especially the works of John Dewey,
Charles Sanders Peirce and Richard Rorty (Cherryholmes, 1992; Johnson and
Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Feilzer, 2010; Tebes, 2012), and it highlights the instru-
mental role of theories in inquiry (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Johnson
and Gray, 2010; Morgan, 2014). According to the pragmatist response, both
the mind-independent physical world and the constructed social and psycholog-
ical world exist, and social reality is a product of both; social scientific research
is value-oriented; and the aim of social scientific research is to solve problems.
The claim is that social scientists do not have to choose between postposi-
tivism and constructivism / interpretivism (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004;
Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009; Creswell and Plano Clark, 2018). They are free
to choose the methods that best meet their needs and purposes and they can
employ both quantitative and qualitative methods in their research (Johnson
and Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Greene, 2006; Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009; Creswell
and Plano Clark, 2018).
Unfortunately, the pragmatist response provides rather weak philosophi-
cal foundations for mixed methods research: it motivates the consideration of
mixed methods as one of several possible options, but does not offer any reason
to think that mixed methods might be better than a single method on its own.
As Greene and Hall (2010, p. 138) observe, ‘Whatever works; whatever can
best engage and usefully inform the important practical problem at hand’ is
the best methodology, from the pragmatist perspective. And Tashakkori and
Teddlie (1998, p. 24) note, ‘Decisions regarding the use of either qualitative or
quantitative methods (or both) depend upon the research question.’ In short,
the pragmatist position merely justifies the inclusion of mixed methods in a
portfolio of possible research designs—it does not provide normative grounds
for using mixed methods. Therefore, the pragmatist position provides at best
‘an attractive philosophical partner for mixed methods research,’ as Johnson
and Onwuegbuzie (2004, p. 14) put it.
Evidential Pluralism can help by providing normative grounds for using
mixed methods. Evidential Pluralism is well motivated as a theory of the
epistemology of causality, and it in turn motivates the use of both qualita-
tive and quantitative methods. Quantitative methods employed by association
studies can confirm both the existence of an appropriate correlation as well
as the existence of an appropriate mechanism (channels C1 and C2 in Fig. 1).
Quantitative methods can also feature in mechanistic studies that investigate
particular links or features of the mechanism of action (channel M1). Other
mechanistic studies can use qualitative methods to test and explore specific
mechanism hypotheses (also M1). It is precisely because one should consider
both association and mechanistic studies that one should pay attention to both
quantitative and qualitative methods.
In addition, Evidential Pluralism can provide guidance on how to integrate
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quantitative and qualitative methods, which is often a challenge for the mixed
methods researcher. Again, Fig. 1 provides the structure of the integration task.
One point at which qualitative and quantitative methods need to be integrated
is in the assessment of specific mechanism hypotheses: the question is the extent
to which key features of relevant mechanisms are confirmed by qualitative and
quantitative methods. Another point of integration is in the assessment of
the general mechanistic claim that there exists a mechanism complex that
explains instances of the putative effect in terms of instances of the putative
cause and that can account for the extent of the observed correlation. As we
see in Fig. 1, one needs to consider quantitative data from association studies
at this stage, as well as the statuses of the specific mechanism hypotheses.
Then there is the assessment of the claim that the putative cause and effect
are correlated, conditional on any potential confounding variables suggested by
background evidence or theory. At this stage, quantitative data will usually be
most relevant, although qualitative methods may also have an influence through
channel M3. Finally, the status of the causal claim depends on the statuses of
the correlation claim and the general mechanistic claim, and it is at this point
that all the qualitative and quantitative data are integrated. Parkkinen et al.
(2018, §7.1) provide some guidance on all these points of integration.
We see then that Evidential Pluralism can help to justify the use of mixed
methods in causal analysis and to structure the data integration task. It is in
this sense that Evidential Pluralism can help to provide coherent philosophical
foundations for mixed methods research.8 These foundations can be viewed as
complementary to those provided by other approaches, such as pragmatism, or
can act in a standalone capacity.
Weinstein’s study of insurgent violence is a good example of the use of
mixed methods research to establish correlation and mechanism. Weinstein
(2007) proposes a theory to explain differences between the ways in which
rebel groups employ violence. He argues that resources and financing are one
key causal factor of the strategies of violence: ‘rebel groups that emerge in en-
vironments rich in natural resources or with the external support of an outside
patron tend to commit high levels of indiscriminate violence; movements that
arise in resource-poor contexts perpetrate far fewer abuses and employ violence
selectively and strategically’ (Weinstein, 2007, p. 7). Weinstein’s theory not
only predicts the correlation between the initial endowment to which rebel lead-
ers have access and their use of violence, but also identifies some mechanisms
linking them. For instance, Weinstein argues that resources shape the member-
ship profile of a rebel group, which in turn affects its internal organisation and
strategies it uses in war. In order to support his theory, Weinstein integrates
qualitative interview-based studies of the rebel groups and community-level
social histories with statistical analysis of original newspaper datasets on pat-
terns of violence in four case studies of rebel groups in Mozambique, Peru,
and Uganda. The quantitative data provides solid evidence of correlation that
supports his theory at the national level, while the qualitative data offers more
nuanced mechanistic evidence at the subnational level. Note that Weinstein
8This justification applies where mixed methods research is used to establish or assess
causal claims. Qualitative and quantitative approaches can also be combined for other pur-
poses: e.g., for hypothesis generation, to gain a general understanding of the social context,
or to ensure that certain stakeholders have a voice that is represented in the evidence base.
Evidential Pluralism does not speak to these other tasks.
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employs mixed methods both to test the general causal claim and also to assess
specific mechanistic hypotheses.9
Another example is Ivankova and Stick’s study of PhD students’ persistence.
Ivankova and Stick (2007) investigate factors that contribute to students’ per-
sistence in a remote-learning doctoral programme. In order to identify factors,
they use a two-phase study, starting with a quantitative approach and followed
by a qualitative approach. The roles of the two approaches are clearly stated
as follows:
In this study, the quantitative data helped identify a potential pre-
dictive power of selected external and internal factors on the dis-
tributed doctoral students’ persistence and purposefully select the
informants for the second phase. Then, a qualitative multiple case
study approach was used to explain why certain external and inter-
nal factors, tested in the first phase, were significant predictors of
students’ persistence in the program. Thus, the quantitative data
and results provided a general picture of the research problem, while
the qualitative data and its analysis refined and explained those sta-
tistical results by exploring the participants’ views regarding their
persistence in more depth. (Ivankova and Stick, 2007, p. 97.)
Interestingly Ivankova and Stick largely avoid causal terminology—perhaps
influenced by the legacy of Yule and other early social scientists. They ex-
plicitly classify their study design as a ‘sequential explanatory mixed methods
design’, i.e., as first identifying factors associated with persistence and then
finding explanations of these associations. But it is apparent that their task is
really causal: they use their results to make a series of recommendations for
how to improve persistence in such programmes, and this move would only be
warranted if the factors they have identified are causes—rather than merely
correlates—of persistence.
From the point of view of Evidential Pluralism, there is no need for any
reticence here with regard to causal claims. This is because Ivankova and Stick
have done what they need to do to confirm causality. They used a quanti-
tative association study to identify factors correlated with persistence in the
programme and then used a qualitative mechanistic study to provide evidence
that there are mechanisms that invoke these factors to explain persistence
(or drop-out). Taken together, these studies provide some good evidence for
causality.10 In situations such as this, an appeal to Evidential Pluralism might
give researchers the confidence to draw causal conclusions.
In sum, Evidential Pluralism can provide coherent philosophical founda-
tions for mixed methods research as applied to causal inquiry. It can also
provide guidance on how to integrate these quantitative and qualitative meth-
ods.
9For example, a combination of interview-based studies and statistical analysis is used
to confirm the causal connection between Renamo’s indiscriminate abuse on non-combatant
populations and the full financial and military backing of the Rhodesian government. For
more detail, see Weinstein (2007, pp. 229–234).
10Whether they have done enough to establish causality is not a question that we shall
attempt to settle here.
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3 Objection: are correlation and mechanism
insufficient?
Having presented the case for applying Evidential Pluralism to the social sci-
ences, we now address two objections: an objection to the claim that establish-
ing correlation and mechanism is sufficient for establishing causation, which
we tackle in this section, and an objection to the claim that establishing both
correlation and mechanism is necessary for establishing causation, which we ad-
dress in the next section. Understanding how it is immune to these objections
will help to highlight some important features of Evidential Pluralism.
One way to object to Evidential Pluralism is to criticise the top part of
Fig. 1, namely the thesis that establishing correlation and mechanism is suffi-
cient to establish causality. Reiss (2009, §4) adopts this strategy, for instance.11
He employs the following hypothetical example. Suppose association studies
establish a correlation between watching violent TV (W ) and violent behaviour
(V ). Given that a correlation on its own fails to establish the causal claim that
W causes V , Evidential Pluralism would suggest that one should also consider
evidence of mechanisms. Now suppose that some such evidence does establish
that there is a mechanism by which watching violent TV leads to increased
aggression, which in turn leads to violent behaviour. (For example, there may
be a psychological mechanism according to which viewers identify with the
aggressive characters on TV and think of the depicted scenarios as realistic,
which then results in more violent behaviour in real life.) One might then con-
clude that W is a cause of V , since both a correlation and a mechanism are
established. But this conclusion may well be erroneous. There may be a mask-
ing mechanism by which W acts as a deterrent in some individuals, reducing
V . Suppose these two mechanisms exactly cancel out and that the correlation
between W and V is in fact attributable to an unmeasured confounder—socio-
economic status, say. Then W is not a cause of V after all, and Evidential
Pluralism seems to have led us astray.
There are three points to make in response to this objection. First, as
we elaborate in §1, Evidential Pluralism requires establishing a correlation
conditional on potential confounders, not an unconditional correlation. Thus in
Reiss’ example, correlation in the appropriate sense is not established, after all.
Hence, nor is the causal claim. Socio-economic status is an obvious potential
confounder, so one would need to test for its influence.
Second, as we emphasised in §1, one needs to establish that the complex
of mechanisms linking the putative cause to the putative effect can account
for the observed correlation. It is not enough to consider a single pathway of
action: one needs to rule out masking by counteracting mechanisms. If it is
established that there is a mechanism of action and if potential counteracting
11Note that Reiss is a conceptual pluralist about causation: he thinks there are multiple
meanings of the word ‘cause’, and that evidence of mechanisms and evidence of correlation
may latch on to different concepts of cause. This is a view that we do not subscribe to, for
reasons espoused by Williamson (2006, 2013), and it is worth emphasising that Evidential
Pluralism need not be accompanied by either conceptual pluralism (the view that we employ
different concepts of cause on different occasions) or metaphysical pluralism (the view that
there are multiple causal relations in reality). Although Reiss presents the following objection
with an appeal to conceptual pluralism, his objection also applies to the more standard view
that evidence of mechanisms and evidence of correlation are evidence for the same concept
of cause.
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mechanisms can be shown to have negligible influence and if the observed cor-
relation is large enough to infer that the putative cause and effect are genuinely
correlated conditional on potential confounders, then one is in a position to es-
tablish the causal claim. The larger the conditional correlation, the less likely
it is that there remain unmeasured confounding variables and unconsidered
counteracting mechanisms: if they were responsible for a large correlation, it
would be likely that we would know about them and have marked them down as
potential confounders / counteractors. A psychological mechanism by which
watching violence discourages violence is an obvious potential counteracting
mechanism, so one would need to examine its influence.
Thus Reiss’ objection is really an objection to a caricature of Evidential
Pluralism, rather than to Evidential Pluralism itself. But there is a third
point to make about Reiss’ objection, which highlights an important aspect of
Evidential Pluralism: Evidential Pluralism is an account of the epistemology
of causality, not an analysis of causality. If it were an analysis of causality
of the form A causes B if and only if A and B are appropriately correlated
and linked by an appropriate mechanism complex then a single hypothetical
counterexample would refute it. But Evidential Pluralism is an account of the
assessment of causal claims, rather than an analysis of causality. Establishing a
claim is a fallible activity; that one might sometimes be mistaken about whether
A causes B does not refute the thesis that the best method for establishing that
A causes B requires establishing that A and B are appropriately correlated and
linked by an appropriate mechanism complex. As long as errors are sufficiently
rare, this method may yet lead to the optimal progression of science. Indeed,
requiring immunity from all possible doubt when establishing a proposition
would prevent that proposition from ever being established. We must balance
the need to avoid falsity with the need to establish truths.
4 Objection: is correlation unnecessary?
We now turn to a second objection to the application of Evidential Pluralism to
the social sciences: an objection to the claim that establishing both correlation
and mechanism is necessary for establishing causation.
In particular, the necessity of establishing correlation has been challenged.
Claveau (2012) considers a counterexample drawn from economics and argues
that the following causal claim was established without establishing correlation:
(C) The strictness of unemployment benefit eligibility (S) reduces the unem-
ployment rate (U).
Claveau suggests that there is a consensus amongst economists that a moni-
toring and sanctions system for unemployment benefits has a powerful effect
on the unemployment rate. Various studies have sought to show that bene-
fit sanctions induce a sharp increase in the exit rate from unemployment to
employment across different countries. In other words, the strictness of unem-
ployment benefit eligibility is a negative cause of the unemployment rate across
countries. Claveau (2012) suggests that this causal claim was established by
mechanistic evidence alone:
The reason why difference-making evidence was not relied on is
rather trivial: there was no measure of [S] comparable across coun-
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tries (and there is still none as far as I am aware). Economists
drew on the available evidence, i.e. mechanistic evidence. And it
seems that this evidence—including clear model predictions and
micro-data evidence in line with them . . . —was sufficient to gather
general support to the claim. (Claveau, 2012, p. 812.)
Claveau’s argument rests on two claims: (i) there is no universal quantita-
tive measure of the strictness of the monitoring and sanctions; (ii) there is only
mechanistic evidence for C. Because of (i), Claveau argues that a correlation
between S and U across countries is difficult to establish. And thus, given
(ii) and given that C is established, it can be concluded that establishing the
existence of a correlation is not required to establish a causal claim.
We would resist Claveau’s conclusions as follows.
Firstly, there was good evidence of correlation in this case. That there
was no good universal measure of S readily available does not imply that S
is unmeasurable and that there is no way of establishing correlation. Claveau
(2012) challenges the use of a coefficient associated with the overall cost of ‘ac-
tive labour market policies’ (ALMPs) as a good universal measure across the
countries. He argues that ALMPs include many factors which are unrelated to
S, such as placement services, subsidised training, and subsidised employment.
However, this does not eliminate the possibility of a good measure of S in each
particular country, even if a good universal measure is not to hand. Moreover,
local measures of S can be used to establish a correlation with U that holds
across countries. For example, van den Berg et al. (2004) show that the im-
position of a particular sanction, namely additional job search assistance, is
significantly positively associated with the transition rate from welfare to work
in the Netherlands, while Lalive et al. (2005) show that warning about bene-
fits reduction is positively correlated with the transition rate in Switzerland.
These studies provide useful evidence of a correlation between U and (some
realisation of) S across the Netherlands and Switzerland. Thus, a correlation
can be established across countries even if (i) holds.
Second, in this case the mechanistic evidence was arguably not enough on
its own to establish causation generally. At best, the existence of a mecha-
nism from benefit sanctions to employment was established in the USA, UK,
the Netherlands, and Switzerland (Johnson and Klepinger, 1994; Dolton and
O’Neill, 1996; van den Berg et al., 2004; Lalive et al., 2005). More would need
to be done to establish a general mechanistic claim that holds more widely
across countries: it would need to be shown that the mechanisms are extrap-
olable to other countries. Thus it appears that the causal claim has not been
established generally, but only in specific countries. It seems to be too hasty
to infer that S reduces U generally.
In sum, it appears, contra Claveau, that claim C may not have been gen-
erally established, and that correlation was established in those countries in
which C was established (with the help of mechanistic studies, as per channel
M3 in Fig. 1). Thus Evidential Pluralism fits this case after all.
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12It is worth noting that Claveau’s ‘mechanistic evidence’ does not coincide with what we
call ‘mechanistic studies.’ For Claveau (2012, p. 810), ‘[t]he first step in getting to mechanistic
evidence is to redescribe the two relata [i.e., cause and effect] at a lower level’. In the case
of unemployment benefits and unemployment rates, Claveau takes mechanistic evidence for
C to be evidence that S reduces U in the particular countries, say, the USA. However, such
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One might think that more convincing counterexamples to the necessity of
establishing correlation emerge in the context of political science. Indeed, po-
litical scientists often make within-case (i.e., single-case) causal inferences by
employing process-tracing methods, and these methods apparently only seek
to identify mechanisms (Bennett, 2010, p. 214). If so, this would cast doubt on
the need to establish evidence of correlation when establishing a causal claim.
However, such cases are not genuine counterexamples: in those process-
tracing studies used for causal inference, evidence of correlation is present,
albeit often implicit, as we shall now see.
According to Beach and Pedersen (2013), process-tracing methods are mainly
used in two situations:
(I) when we know that a correlation exists between X and Y but
we are in the dark regarding potential mechanisms linking the two
(X-Y -centric theory-building) as we have no theory to guide us; or
(II) when we know an outcome (Y ) but are unsure about the causes
(Y -centric theory building). (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, p. 16.)
Neither situation provides a counterexample to Evidential Pluralism. In X-
Y -centric situations, correlation has already been established: ‘we know that
a correlation exists between X and Y .’ In Y -centric situations, evidence of
correlation is also required. As Beach and Pedersen (2013, p. 16) note, ‘in the
[Y -centric] instance, the analysis first traces backward from Y to undercover a
plausible X, turning the study into an X-Y -Centric analysis.’ Thus, in order
to utilise process-tracing method in the Y -centric situation, one needs to turn
a Y -centric analysis to an X-Y -centric analysis, which assumes a correlation
between X and Y . In other words, in uncovering a plausible X, one searches
for a factor for which correlation with Y has already been established. So,
as Bennett (2010, pp. 208–209) also observes, process tracing is mainly used
to provide further evidence for causation, having already obtained evidence of
correlation.
Beach and Pedersen (2013) also indicate a third situation in which process
tracing is used: this is where it is used for the purpose of explaining a particular
outcome or event. One might think that these explaining-outcome process-
tracing studies pose a problem for Evidential Pluralism, as correlation is rarely
explicitly discussed in such studies. In response, we would would make the
following two points.
On the one hand, many explaining-outcome process tracing studies do not
seek to establish causal claims. Rather, they aim to ‘explain particular histor-
ical outcomes’ (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, p. 63) and historical explanations
are not always causal. For example, Wood (2003) is cited by Beach and Peder-
sen (2013, p. 63) as an example of explaining-outcome process-tracing. Wood
provides an explanation of insurgent collective action in El Salvador by identify-
ing ‘three reasons that participants supported the mobilisation and insurgency’
(Wood, 2003, p. 231). This study stops short of establishing causal claims. For
this reason, many explaining-outcome process-tracing studies fall outside the
remit of Evidential Pluralism.
evidence would not on its own constitute a mechanistic study, as it does not shed light on
features of a mechanism linking S to U .
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On the other hand, Evidential Pluralism does indeed apply to situations in
which explaining-outcome studies seek specifically causal explanations. More-
over we contend that such studies require evidence of correlation. As Beach
and Pedersen (2013, p. 18) observe, where explaining-outcome process-tracing
studies seek causes, they aim ‘to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a
particular outcome, with sufficiency defined as an explanation that accounts
for all of the important aspects of an outcome with no redundant parts being
present.’ In order to establish X as a minimally sufficient explanation of Y by
process tracing, there needs to be a correlation between X and Y , for otherwise
X would give no reason to expect Y . Here the causal claim is single-case (i.e.,
X and Y are single-case outcomes), so the correlation required is a single-case
correlation: the chance of Y given X differs from the chance of Y in the ab-
sence of X, conditional on potential confounders. Evidence for this single-case
correlation may take the form of association studies that support a generic
correlation in a population to which this particular case belongs. But the evi-
dence might also include mechanistic studies that elucidate the mechanisms in
operation in the presence of X and those in operation in the absence of X. A
comparison of these two cases can sometimes confirm correlation via routes M1
and M3 of Figure 1.
13 Note that Evidential Pluralism does not require that
any of these studies be new studies—the correlation may have been established
previously.
Skocpol’s study on social revolutions includes examples of this kind of pro-
cess tracing (Goldstone, 1997; George and Bennett, 2005; Mahoney, 2012b).
Skocpol (1979) argues that international pressure and peasant rebellion are
two causes of social revolutions in France, Russia, and China. She uses process
tracing to show how each of the two independent variables (i.e., international
pressure and peasant rebellion) set into motion a complex sequence of events
that culminate in revolutionary social transformation in each country. Overall,
as George and Bennett (2005, p. 227) argue, Skocpol’s use of process tracing
shows ‘how these two variables were causally related to the revolutionary so-
cial transformation in each of these countries.’ Skocpol does this by providing
evidence of correlation in addition to evidence of mechanism: by unpacking
the detail of the mechanisms and carrying out a contrastive analysis, Skocpol
argues that international pressure and peasant rebellion are associated with
outbreaks of social revolutions.14
13For example, a comparison between the mechanisms operating when a parachute is
engaged and those operating when no parachute is engaged provide some evidence of a
correlation between a particular parachute use and serious injury (see §1).
Thus, there is a distinction between establishing a case-specific mechanism from the pres-
ence of X to Y and establishing that X is a cause of Y , because the latter requires establishing
correlation, which depends on a comparison with the case in which X is absent. For example,
having established a case-specific mechanism between the assassination of Archduke Ferdi-
nand and the outbreak of the First World War, further evidence of correlation is needed in
order to establish the claim that the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand is a cause of the
outbreak of the First World War. This further evidence would need to establish that the
chance of the outbreak of World War I would have differed in the absence of the assassination.
14Skocpol’s contrastive analysis involves comparing the abortive Russian Revolution of
1905 with the successful Russian Revolution of 1917 and using some aspects of English,
Japanese, and German history as contrasts to those of French, Russian, and Chinese history.
A question arises as to whether this contrastive analysis, which can be thought of as an
instance of Mill’s method of difference, is a process-tracing technique or something that goes
beyond process tracing (Goldstone, 1997; George and Bennett, 2005). Either way, Skocpol’s
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Skocpol can be thought of as providing examples of explaining-outcome
process tracing for the following reason. Beach and Pedersen (2013, p. 19)
construe explaining-outcome process tracing as an iterative research strategy
that aims to trace ‘case-specific mechanisms’ that ‘cannot be detached from the
particular case’. However, ‘explaining-outcome studies often have theoretical
ambitions that reach beyond the single case’ (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, p. 19).
These descriptions seem to fit Skocpol’s work well, as she identifies three case-
specific mechanisms and connects them to two causal variables. Thus her study
has ambitions to connect the three cases, but she stops short of making any
generic causal claim.
We see, then, that evidence of correlation is required even where politi-
cal scientists make within-case causal inferences by employing process-tracing
methods. A consideration of these within-case inferences shows that Eviden-
tial Pluralism offers more than an account of the epistemology of generic (i.e.,
repeatedly instantiable) causal claims in the social sciences—it also provides
an account of the epistemology of single-case causal claims.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we set out a specific approach to the assessment of causal claims,
Evidential Pluralism, and argued that this approach can be fruitfully applied to
the social sciences. In particular, we argued that applying Evidential Pluralism
to the social sciences yields the following benefits. Firstly, it motivates a new
methodology for evidence-based policy. This methodology extends the evidence
base to include mechanistic studies, which are undervalued by present-day EBP.
Second, it provides an account of the confirmatory relationships in basic social
science research. This can help researchers to structure their own efforts to
establish causal claims, as well as to understand and evaluate the attempts of
others. Third, Evidential Pluralism can help to provide coherent philosophical
foundations for mixed methods research: it motivates the need to integrate
quantitative and qualitative research in the context of causal analysis. We also
defended Evidential Pluralism against two objections that stem from social
science examples—objections to the necessity and sufficiency of evidence of
correlation and evidence of mechanisms—and saw that Evidential Pluralism
offers an account of the epistemology of both generic and single-case causal
claims.
Two key points are worth reiterating.
Firstly, Evidential Pluralism holds that in order to establish a causal claim,
one normally needs to establish both the existence of an appropriate conditional
correlation and the existence of an appropriate mechanism complex. Associ-
ation studies and mechanistic studies can provide evidence that is relevant to
both these latter claims: it should not be assumed that association studies
only provide evidence of correlation, nor that mechanistic studies only provide
evidence of mechanisms.
Second, Evidential Pluralism is a normative epistemological thesis, con-
cerning how one ought to assess causal claims. We do not maintain that every
study clearly provides both evidence of correlation and evidence of mechanism for her within-
case causal inferences.
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actual assessment of a causal claim in the social sciences can be rationally re-
constructed as conforming to Evidential Pluralism. In the social sciences, not
all science is good science. Nevertheless, we do hold that episodes of good
science do conform to Evidential Pluralism, and that Evidential Pluralism can
provide a useful tool for research scientists and policy makers to help structure
research and evaluation. This is not to say that assessing a causal claim in
accordance with Evidential Pluralism will guarantee success. The act of estab-
lishing a causal claim is fallible, and even good science can be misled, where
evidence is misleading.
Finally, we acknowledge that a programmatic paper like this is liable to
raise more questions than it has space to answer. For example, the precise
relationship between Evidential Pluralism and related methods such as process
tracing and contribution analysis merits a more detailed exploration than is
possible here. Another important task for further research would be to situate
Evidential Pluralism more precisely within the rich plethora of philosophical
traditions in the social sciences. It would also be interesting to investigate
whether Evidential Pluralism can be extrapolated beyond the biomedical and
social sciences—e.g., to the physical sciences.
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